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INTRODUCTION
Since its inception,the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa,Act 108
1996 has time and again compelled the refinement, revision and, in some
cases,the abandonment of established legal principles.In this note we consider
the impact of the recent Supreme Court of Appeal decision in Bock & others v
Duburoro Investments (Pty) Ltd 2004 (2) SA 242 (SCA) on the debate
concerning the constitutionality of parate executie clauses in pledges of
movables. Simply put, these clauses (almost invariably included in pledge
agreements) provide for the sale by the creditor, on default by the debtor, of
property pledged to the creditor without recourse to the courts.The primary
issue is whether these clauses unjustifiably infringe s 34 of the Constitution,
which grants everyone the right to have ‘any dispute that can be resolved by
the application of law’ decided in a court or independent tribunal.
This debate arose as a result of the Constitutional Court decisions in Chief
Lesapo v North West Agricultural Bank 2000 (1) SA 409 (CC) and First National
Bank of South Africa Ltd v Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa; Sheard v
Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa 2000 (3) SA 626 (CC).In Lesapo and
Sheard the Constitutional Court dealt with statutory provisions in the
agricultural field (provisions of the Land Bank Act 13 of 1944 and the North
West Agricultural Bank Act 14 of 1981) entitling banks to seize and sell the
property of defaulting farmers without an order of court. The court struck
down these provisions as unconstitutional. In Lesapo (supra) para 22 it held
that in allowing the court process to be bypassed, these provisions entitled
banks to engage in impermissible acts of self-help, and commented that ‘the
right of access to court is the bulwark against vigilantism and the chaos and
anarchy which it causes’. In so deciding, the court made the important point
that while the constitutional right, on the face of it, is concerned with disputes
between parties, creditors must nevertheless approach a court before seizing
and selling property even where there is no dispute concerning the validity of the
obligation between the parties or concerning the debtor’s default (Lesapo
(supra) para 15).
The issue of the constitutionality of parate executie clauses in pledges of
movables has not yet come before the Constitutional Court. Other courts
have, however, dealt with the issue and the decision in Bock (supra) is, at the
time of writing,the latest to deal explicitly with the matter.Subsequent to the
decision in Bock, the Supreme Court of Appeal handed down the decision in
Juglal NO v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd t/a OK Franchise Division 2004 (5) SA
248 (SCA). We do briefly consider this case, given the references in it to the
Bock decision;we do not,however,discuss it in detail as,unlike Bock,it does not
concern a pledge of movables.
While this note does discuss the Supreme Court of Appeal’s reasoning in
Bock, it does not purport to comment on the correctness of the court’s
conclusions,nor does it seek to provide a detailed analysis of the constitution-
ality of parate executie clauses.Rather,our aim is to examine the impact of the
decision on the debate about these clauses and to demonstrate that the
conclusion that the case has resolved this debate may be premature.
THE  FACTS  IN BOCK
The Bock case essentially involved an appeal by sureties (the appellants) for
release from their obligations under a number of deeds of suretyship. The
appellants stood surety for the obligations of L S Molope Holdings (Pty) Ltd
(the debtor) to three banks. The respondent was the cessionary of the banks’
claims (the creditor).The issues pertaining to each of the sureties and each of
the banks were similar and were heard (and discussed by the court) together.
Shares were pledged to secure the principal debt.On default by the debtor,the
banks took over the pledged shares and reduced the value of the debtor’s
indebtedness by the value of these shares.The appellants argued,inter alia,that
the manner in which this was done prejudiced them, and this led to their
release from the suretyships.
The court analysed the pledge contained in the documents of one of the
banks (which was similar to that of the other banks).This permitted the bank,
on default by the debtor ‘immediately or at any time thereafter irrevocably
and in rem suam or at its discretion . . . to realise the securities . . . or to take
over the securities at the bank’s election at a fair value’ (quoted in Bock (supra)
para 5).The court noted that in terms of this clause,the bank could elect either
to realize the pledged shares by disposing of them to a third party or to take
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them over at a fair value. The court drew a distinction (para 6) between three
distinct legal concepts:
‘(a) The right to dispose of a pledged article without the intervention of a court order,
commonly known as parate executie; (b) the contractual right of taking over a pledged article
by the creditor — a pactum commissorium; and (c) the quasi conditional sale whereby the
creditor may, upon default, take over a pledge at a fair price.’
In this case the bank took over the shares itself, and the outcome in this
matter related to the validity of this action and its effect on the validity of the
suretyships (with the court concluding that the sureties were not released
from their obligations).The outcome of the case did not rest on the legality of
parate executie clauses. In fact, the court explicitly points out that the banks
did not purport to exercise a right of summary execution (para 16).
These clauses are,however, discussed at some length — the reason for this
being that the court a quo and ‘the appellants in argument’ had assumed that
the right exercised by the banks was a right of parate executie (para 11). The
appellants had argued that such clauses are unconstitutional in that they
conflict with s 34 of the Constitution.A similar argument, albeit on different
facts, had succeeded in the earlier case of Findevco (Pty) Ltd v Faceformat SA
(Pty) Ltd 2001 (1) SA 251 (E), to which we now turn in order to explore in
greater detail the background to the decision in Bock.
THE FINDEVCO DECISION
Findevco concerned a perfection clause in a general notarial bond. Perfection
clauses, such as the one in question in this case, authorize a creditor to take
possession of a debtor’s movable property to perfect its security and to dispose
of such property.The debtor remains in possession of the property but agrees
that the creditor is entitled to take possession on default.On grounds that have
subsequently been severely criticized (notably by Professor Susan Scott in
‘Summary execution clauses in pledge and perfecting clauses in notarial
bonds’ 2002 (65) THRHR 656), Froneman J found the perfection clause in
question to be unconstitutional.
The broad statements of Froneman J in Findevco also cast doubt upon the
constitutionality of parate executie clauses in the context of pledges of
movables.This caused quite a stir amongst creditors and lawyers whose tried
and tested security mechanisms were called into question. Understandably,
the case gave rise to considerable uncertainty.
Uncertainty in this area was particularly disturbing given that parate
executie clauses are used in numerous commercial contexts. While the
Constitutional Court cases mentioned above dealt with fairly uncomplicated
relationships of the farmer/land bank type,the use of parate executie clauses is
widespread and extends to highly sophisticated and complex financial
transactions involving significant sums of money. In the derivatives arena, for
example, certain provisions in standard derivatives securities documents
(including para 8 of the New York Credit Support Annex published by the
International Swaps and Derivatives Association) provide for parate executie
in respect of pledged property, and the enforceability of such clauses has been
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debated (for example, at the ISDA South Africa Conference: Update on New
2002 ISDA Documentation Projects, held in Johannesburg on 21 August 2002).
The uncertainty has also had an impact on the security arrangements to be
considered when developing securitization structures. The cross-border
nature of many of these transactions means that uncertainty in this area has the
potential to influence the attractiveness of deals or transactions that are
connected to South Africa.
Given the potentially serious consequences of the approach in Findevco
(further noted by Scott op cit), many practitioners anticipated that the view
reflected in that case regarding parate executie clauses in pledges of movables
would be tempered, if not overruled, by a future decision.
CONTINUING  UNCERTAINTY
The issue of the constitutionality of perfection and parate executie clauses was
revisited in three notable judgments:Tems Fresh Meat Wholesalers v D.Z.’s Meat
Centre CC (unreported) WLD Case 2001/5487 (judgment of Jordaan AJ,
handed down on 12 July 2001);De Beer v Keyser 2002 (1) SA 827 (SCA); and
Senwes Ltd v Muller 2002 (4) SA 134 (T). Rather than providing a speedy
resolution of the issue, these contradictory and conflicting decisions
exacerbated the uncertainty.
The Tems case also dealt with a perfection clause in a general notarial bond.
After analysing the Constitutional Court decisions, the court concluded that
it could not agree with the Findevco decision that these clauses were uncon-
stitutional. Jordaan AJ distinguished the Constitutional Court decisions,
where the banks’powers were authorized by statute,from the facts before him
and saw no reason why contracting parties could not insert such clauses into a
contract by mutual agreement. The court furthermore emphasized that the
constitutional provision was concerned with disputes between parties.Where
there is no dispute, parties should be free to rely on perfection clauses. The
judge justified his decision on commercial grounds, holding that to
‘emasculate’ notarial bonds by following the Findevco approach would
discourage creditors from granting credit, and this would not be in the
interests of the economy or entrepreneurs (Tems (supra) at 15).While this may
be a laudable approach commercially, it seems to contradict the express
holding in the Constitutional Court decisions that recourse to a court is
required even in the absence of a dispute.In view of the divergence of opinion
on the matter, it is both interesting and disconcerting to note that the Tems
decision was not reported.
The Supreme Court of Appeal touched on this matter in passing in the
case of De Beer (supra).While the court did not regard the matter before it as
involving parate executie, it did briefly consider the constitutionality of such
clauses, noting that such clauses in private security agreements had recently
been held to be constitutionally invalid (para 26). Although the Supreme
Court of Appeal did not decide the matter,this reference in passing seemed to
endorse the Findevco approach.
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In the final case to be noted,Senwes (supra), the bond in question expressly
allowed the creditor to attach and sell mortgaged movable property without
recourse to the courts. Moseneke AJ had no trouble in finding this clause
unconstitutional.He stated, however, that clauses such as the one in question
(which he regarded as a parate executie clause) are merely collateral to the main
purpose of the agreement,which is to provide security,and that the offending
provisions could be severed from the rest of the agreement so that the
remainder could still be enforced (at 142I-143A). By severing the offending
provisions, the clause was interpreted in such a manner as to require the
assistance of the courts.
AND  ALONG  CAME BOCK
At this point there were contradictory High Court decisions, with the
Supreme Court of Appeal appearing to endorse the Findevco position that
contractual parate executie clauses are unconstitutional, and going so far as to
remark on their ‘objectionable features’ (De Beer (supra) para 27). In its
decision in Bock (with different members of the court sitting) the Supreme
Court of Appeal,however,appears to have indicated that it views the Findevco
decision as wrong in so far as it regarded parate executie clauses in pledges of
movables as unconstitutional.
Word of the Bock decision spread rapidly,prompting a collective sigh of relief
that the matter had been settled in favour of the constitutionality of parate
executie clauses in pledge agreements. Such confident feelings of relief may,
however,be premature; in our view, the case does not prevent a future litigant
mounting a plausible argument against the constitutionality of these clauses.
The first and obvious point is that the issue is a constitutional one and,
given that the Constitutional Court is the highest court in all constitutional
matters (s 167(3) of the Constitution), the matter can strictly speaking be
regarded as settled only once the Constitutional Court has considered it.In so
far as the decisions of the Supreme Court of Appeal are taken as an indication
of the possible future direction of the debate,however,a discussion of the Bock
decision is certainly relevant.
Our second general point, alluded to earlier, is that the statements of the
Supreme Court of Appeal in Bock regarding parate executie clauses are,in fact,
obiter. A litigant could well argue this in a subsequent case and may even
point to the apparently conflicting obiter statements of the same court in the
De Beer case.Admittedly, these latter statements are less forceful than those to
be found in Bock and, in addition, a strong obiter statement of the Supreme
Court of Appeal would be persuasive in a lower court.The obiter statements
in Bock could also be seen as having been bolstered by the subsequent decision
in Juglal (supra), given the latter case’s endorsement of Bock and rejection of
Findevco. Juglal, however, provides limited support as it deals with perfection
clauses in general notarial bonds and,in so far as it can be seen to address parate
executie clauses in pledges of movables,the court’s comments in Juglal are also
obiter.
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Any future challenge to the constitutionality of parate executie clauses in
pledges of movables would nevertheless have to deal with the forceful
statements made in Bock (and the court’s approval of these in Juglal).As we see
it, however, the manner in which the court in Bock addressed the issues does
not dispose of the matter in such a way as to close the door to such a challenge.
We now turn to a brief review of certain aspects of the judgment to illustrate
this point.
The court’s approach
Harms JA, writing for the court, begins his discussion of parate executie
clauses by noting that the principles pertaining to these clauses are trite: they
are,with limited exceptions, invalid in mortgages of immovable property but
valid in the case of movables held in pledge (Bock (supra) para 9).The proviso
in this latter instance,as stated in the leading case of Osry v Hirsch,Loubser & Co
Ltd 1922 CPD 531 at 547, is that a debtor may ‘seek the protection of the
Court if, upon any just ground, he can show that, in carrying out the
agreement and effecting a sale, the creditor has acted in a manner which has
prejudiced him in his rights’.
After briefly discussing the principles pertaining to the distinct legal
concepts of pactum commissorium and conditional sale,Harms JA goes on to
consider the appellants’ argument that parate executie clauses in a pledge of
movables are unconstitutional. The appellants based this argument on the
Constitutional Court’s decisions in Lesapo (supra) and Sheard (supra) which,as
previously noted, concerned the constitutionality of legislative provisions
allowing state seizure and sale of movable and immovable property belonging
to and held by the debtor.
Harms JA’s response to this is that he finds it ‘difficult to extend the
proscription of these statutory provisions . . . to parate executie of movables
which are lawfully in the possession of the creditor’ (para 13).With reference
to a number of passages in Lesapo which identified the offending features in
the statutory provisions, Harms JA notes (ibid) that a parate executie clause
‘does not authorise a creditor to bypass the courts and ‘‘seize and sell the debtor’s property of
which the debtor was in lawful and undisturbed possession’’. It does not entitle the creditor
‘‘to take the law into his or her hands’’.It does not permit ‘‘the seizure of property against the
will of a debtor in possession of such property’’.’
A further distinguishing factor for Harms JA is the proviso noted in Osry
(supra) that the debtor is able to seek the protection of the court if his rights
are unduly prejudiced in the course of the creditor’s exercising his right of
parate executie. This, to Harms JA, indicates that the creditor could not be
seen to be a judge in his own cause (ibid).
Harms JA sees the law relating to parate executie clauses as drawing a clear
and ‘sensible distinction’between instances where the creditor is in possession
of the security and those where such security is in the hands of the debtor
(para 14). The Constitutional Court decisions concerned provisions that
entitled the creditor to take possession of and sell property held by the debtor
— this being a deviation from the common-law position referred to above.
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Without further consideration, Harms JA states that it follows that the
judgment in Findevco is wrong in so far as it found that the common-law rules
relating to parate executie of movables were unconstitutional. He does not
feel it necessary to provide further reasons for this, stating that Prof Scott’s
criticisms of Findevco, in the article referred to above, are ‘generally to the
point’ (para 15).
Analysis of the court’s approach
We see a number of difficulties with the above approach that render question-
able any reliance on these statements as a definitive pronouncement on the
constitutionality of the clauses. What the case seems to be saying (in simple
terms) is:
(i) the provisions in Lesapo and Sheard that were found to be
unconstitutional were statutory provisions;
(ii) the common-law position on contractual parate executie clauses can be
distinguished from the prohibited statutory provisions; and
(iii) therefore, the common-law contractual provisions are not
unconstitutional.
Although the court admittedly did provide some independent bases for
regarding the common-law contractual provisions as constitutional — other
than that they simply differed from the unconstitutional statutory provisions
— there still appears to be a substantial gap in the reasoning of the court.This
gap might have been overcome had these independent bases been explored
further and a full constitutional analysis undertaken.Simply saying that (a) the
creditor is not seizing property of which the debtor was in possession; (b) that
the debtor can seek the protection of the court if there has been prejudice to
the debtor in the manner in which the creditor has acted;(c) that the common
law recognizes the unlawfulness of self-help (all at para 13); and (d) that
Professor Scott has cogently criticized Findevco (para 15) does not amount to a
sufficient constitutional analysis. Of course, the absence of a comprehensive
analysis may be explained on the basis that this was an obiter discussion and by
the fact that the appellants did not properly place the issues before the court.
The fact remains, however, that the Supreme Court of Appeal has made a
forceful statement on the issue.We feel that there is room for criticism of each
of the bases for its decision put forward by the court.
 First basis: The debtor may seek the protection of the court if there has been
prejudice
Turning first to the argument that the debtor may seek the protection of the
court if, in carrying out the provisions of the agreement and effecting a sale,
the creditor has acted to the prejudice of the debtor. In these circumstances
the onus is on the debtor to institute a challenge.There is no obligation on the
creditor to approach the court before acting. The Constitutional Court has,
however, said that the ability of the debtor to challenge the actions of the
NOTES 725
creditor in court does not remedy the deficiencies in an otherwise
unconstitutional process. In Lesapo (supra) para 20 the court stated that ‘[t]he
fact that the debtor may have recourse to a court of law after the attachment
takes place does not cure the limitation of the right; it merely restricts its
duration’. While this passage refers to attachments, the important point that
applies equally here is that the ability of the debtor to challenge the actions of
the creditor does not necessarily remedy the mischief. It should be noted,
however, that our point is not that creditors should, in all circumstances, be
obliged to approach a court every time they wish to take action in relation to
their debtors — there are certainly occasions where a debtor should be the
party who bears the onus of instituting action after the creditor has acted (for
example, where a creditor cancels a contract pursuant to an unremedied
breach). The point is simply (as the Constitutional Court has emphasized)
that the Constitution requires creditors to approach a court prior to taking
action in certain circumstances. A more detailed constitutional analysis is
demanded in order to identify whether these circumstances are present in a
particular case.
 Second basis: Possession of the property by the creditor
The court placed most of the emphasis in its discussion on the issue of
possession. It repeatedly emphasized the fact that, in a pledge of movables, the
creditor is already in possession of the property subject to summary execution.
It is suggested that the objectionable ‘self-help’ would lie in the unlawful
seizure of the property. Where the creditor is in possession, this concern is
alleviated. The significance of possession is re-iterated in the Juglal decision
(supra) para 9. There are a number of points to be made here:
(i) In the earlier Supreme Court of Appeal decision in De Beer (supra), the
court seemed to indicate that what was objectionable about parate
executie clauses was not the seizure of the property but its sale by the
creditor,stating (para 26) that ‘[t]he principal objection to the practice is
that without judicial control the property might be sold by the creditor
on terms that are unduly prejudicial to the debtor.’ While the response
to this could be that the debtor has access to court if the creditor has
acted in a manner prejudicial to the debtor,as indicated earlier, this does
not sufficiently answer a charge of unconstitutionality.
(ii) While the Constitutional Court, in Lesapo (supra) and Sheard (supra),
did admittedly speak in terms of the dual actions of seizing and selling,
there are dicta in these decisions that would support the argument that a
sale by a creditor of property already lawfully in its possession — in
other words without the separate seizure of the property — may be
unconstitutional. For example, in Lesapo Mokgoro J, when discussing
s 34 of the Constitution,comments (para 16) that ‘any constraint upon a
person or property shall be exercised by another only after recourse to a
court recognised in terms of the law of the land’.While this statement is
clearly very broad and would capture innumerable transactions
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involving the transfer and disposal of property, the point is that the
court was not concerned only with the unsupervised seizure of
property by a creditor. The argument about the distinguishing and
redeeming feature of parate executie clauses in a pledge of movables,
being that the creditor is already in possession of the property, thus does
not fully address the constitutional concerns.
(iii) The arguments regarding possession also need to be carefully made
where, as in Bock (supra), the property pledged is incorporeal, such as
shares. This is particularly so when one considers that many security
arrangements involve the pledge of dematerialized shares.This ‘pledge’
involves the electronic noting of the security interest of the creditor in
the electronic share account of the debtor held with a Central Securities
Depository Participant (on this see s 6 of the Custody and Adminis-
tration of Securities Act 85 of 1992 and s 91A of the Companies Act 61
of 1973). This seems far removed from the traditional notion of
possession and control on which the common-law principles are based.
Should parate executie clauses in pledges of dematerialized shares be
treated differently from parate executie clauses in pledges of certificated
shares? Surely possession as a distinguishing factor seems arbitrary in
these circumstances and calls for a more subtle analysis?
 Third basis: The court’s reliance on Scott
While possession also features strongly in the arguments of Scott op cit, she
sees a further distinction between cases where the debtor has consented to
action being taken in respect of its property and cases where it has not. She
argues that ‘[i]n a summary execution clause in a pledge of movables there is
no spoliation (no self-help) since the pledgor has already voluntarily parted
with his/her possession and has authorized the pledgee to sell the property at
an execution sale’ (at 662) and later (at 663) that ‘[t]he existence of these
clauses in pledge agreements is based on expediency and the freedom of
contract. If a person is willing to part with his/her property voluntarily to
secure a debt,why should that person not be allowed to authorize the creditor
to sell the property without recourse to the courts, should the debtor be in
default?’ The court in Juglal (supra) paras 10 and 27 makes a similar point.
This distinction also does not draw the dividing line between
constitutionality and unconstitutionality. First, the argument here should at
least consider the issues raised by waiving or contracting out of constitutional
rights. Secondly, our common law of contract is replete with examples of
instances where parties cannot simply include in their contracts whatever
provisions they deem fit. See, for example, those cases dealing with the
unenforceability of pactum commissorium provisions (a recent example of
which is cited in Bock (supra) para 8) and those dealing with certificates of
indebtedness constituting conclusive proof (for example, Ex parte Minster of
Justice: In re Nedbank Ltd v Abstein Distributors (Pty) Ltd and Donelly v Barclays
National Bank Ltd 1995 (3) SA 1 (A)).
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Scott’s article does, however, provide a cogent critique of the Findevco
decision in a number of respects. In particular, as Harms JA noted in Bock
(supra) para 15, Scott points out the failure of the Findevco judgment to
distinguish between the distinct legal concepts of perfection clauses, statutory
powers to seize the property of debtors and summary execution clauses in
pledge agreements. Harms JA’s statement, however, that ‘[i]t is not necessary
to deal with all the reasons for this conclusion [that the finding in Findevco that
the law relating to parate executie clauses in pledges of movables is
unconstitutional, is wrong] since the criticism of Prof Susan Scott is generally
to the point’ (para 15) is problematic in a number of respects.
It does not seem satisfactory to incorporate by reference an academic
critique in lieu of providing reasons.It may be argued that it was not necessary
for the court to provide reasons on this point as it was an obiter discussion.
The statement that Findevco is wrong,however,is made in strong terms and the
strength of the statement would seem to require that substantial reasons be
provided.
Reliance on Scott’s article also brings with it the deficiencies in that article.
What we are concerned about in Scott’s article is not her analysis of the
common-law position regarding parate executie clauses.Rather,it is that in an
analysis of a case dealing with the constitutionality of parate executie clauses
she does not herself undertake a comprehensive constitutional analysis in
accordance with the established tools and techniques developed by the
Constitutional Court before stating that the Findevco judgment is ‘patently
wrong’(Scott op cit 656) and should not be followed.Of course,Findevco itself
did not offer a thorough constitutional analysis, but a critique of that
judgment that finds it ‘patently wrong’ should address that problem.
THE JUGLAL DECISION
The Juglal case (supra) concerned a perfection clause in a general notarial
bond rather than a parate executie clause in a pledge. Consequently, the
relevance of the case to the present discussion is limited. The court in Jugal,
however, does not draw a clear distinction between these types of clauses,
despite Bock having emphasized the need to do so. The failure to make this
distinction means that there are a number of instances where it is not obvious
whether the dicta of the court are intended to apply only to perfection clauses
or to execution clauses in general. This, in turn, requires that some attention
be given to this case when considering the constitutionality of parate executie
clauses in pledges of movables.
Some of the points to be raised in relation to Juglal are the following:
(i) The court explicitly endorses Bock,noting that the refusal of the court a
quo to follow the reasoning of Froneman J in Findevco was ‘proved
justified by the decision of this Court in Bock’ (para 9). The court does
not,however,fully explain its reliance on Bock and it is thus not apparent
what principles have been affirmed. Furthermore, the court does not
address any of the weaknesses in Bock that we have identified here.
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(ii) Certain of the shortcomings of Bock are, in fact, repeated in Juglal. As
noted above, the court focuses on the distinction between circum-
stances where the security is in the hands of the creditor and where it is
in the hands of the debtor (paras 9, 25 and 26). While possession may
certainly be a relevant factor, as discussed above, it does not draw the
dividing line between what is constitutional and what is not.
(iii) As in Bock, the court also does not undertake a thorough constitutional
analysis.There is a brief reference to the discussion by the court a quo of
the constitutional issues and to its finding that ‘the common law of
contract does not allow parate execution in a manner which infringes
the right of recourse to the courts entrenched in section 34 of the
Constitution’ (para 9). Heher JA goes on state (para 10) that Hurt J, in
the court a quo, concluded that
‘while parate executie in theory detracted from the entrenched right, in practice the clause
was hedged about with conditions which fully preserve the debtor’s right to approach a
court for relief. He said, with reference to section 39(3) of the Constitution:
‘‘A court should be chary of developing the common law in a way which impinges
upon the fundamental principles of contract such as the freedom to contract on
properly consensual terms and the principles of pacta sunt servanda which I think it can
safely be said, are fundamentally consistent with the Bill of Rights.’’ ’
A number of these considerations are certainly relevant in a constitutional
analysis; the issues of contractual freedom and pacta sunt servanda would, for
example, be relevant in the limitations enquiry. The bulk of the court’s
discussion focuses on whether the relevant clauses were contrary to public
policy and the court’s extensive discussion in this regard would also play a part
in the constitutional analysis.As in Bock,however,a full constitutional analysis,
separating out a rights enquiry and a limitations enquiry, is not undertaken.
CONCLUSION
At some point, a thorough analysis is required for the law relating to the
constitutionality of parate executie clauses in pledges of movables to be
settled. This is not provided by Bock (or Juglal) and an analysis of the court’s
decision reveals a number of areas of uncertainty.Perhaps the gap left by Bock
will allow a further opportunity for a litigant to bring the matter before the
Constitutional Court for a thorough analysis.
As stated at the outset, we do not here volunteer a comprehensive
constitutional analysis.Such an analysis of this issue should,however,address at
least the following:
(i) The scope of the right of access to courts. How far does s 34 extend?
What conduct or provisions does it prohibit and why?
(ii) Do parate executie clauses in pledges of movables constitute such
prohibited provisions? Are possession of the property by the creditor or
consent by the debtor relevant here?
(We would submit that considerations of expediency and commercial
necessity are not appropriately dealt with at this stage. If parate executie
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clauses in pledges are found to violate s 34, these concerns should be
addressed at the next stage.)
(iii) Is the violation of s 34 by the common-law rule relating to parate
executie in pledges of movables reasonable and justifiable in an open
and democratic society in accordance with the limitation clause, s 36 of
the Constitution?
Until this analysis is undertaken and these sorts of questions answered,and
the matter dealt with by the Constitutional Court, the law in this area cannot
be regarded as settled.
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